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Abstract With the construction of the ‘‘3-level, 3-vertical-
line, and 1-circle’’ power backbone in China, it’s stricter and
stricter on relay protection system and security and stability
control system (SSCS) for reliable power transmission. Lots
of blackouts in the world had happened, one main reason for
which is the hidden failures of relay protection system or
SSCS. Much work had been done about the hidden failure of
relay protection, including classification, probability model,
analysis methods of effects on power grid, and monitoring
measures, which was summarized in the paper. The opera-
tion experiences of SSCS indicated that there might be
hidden failures in five links of the security and stability
control device (SSCD), e.g. measuring, control strategy,
setting, communication and voting pattern. In addition, the
coordination hidden failure among relay protection system,
SSCS, and power plant’s parameters related to the power
grid was pointed out for more attention. In the future,
amounts of work will be expected to be conducted on hidden
failure: model building, assessment methods, application of
research achievements, operation management of secondary
equipment, and coordination problem between the relay
protection system and the SSCS.
Keywords Relay protection, Security and stability
control device, Hidden failure, Coordination
1 Introduction
In China, a ‘‘3-level, 3-vertical-line, and 1-circle’’ power
backbone will be formed in the future, where the ultra-high-
voltage (UHV) AC and DC transmission projects have been
built, to help transferring power energy from large-scale
energy bases to the major load centers. In order to ensure the
security and reliability of power transmission, the protection
system and security and stability control system (SSCS) must
be highly reliable, being its strong backing. Committed to
reducing the failure losses as best as possible by taking dif-
ferent control measures, the antecessors of China’s elec-
tricity proposed the concept of three-defense lines with relay
protection system and SSCS respectively lying in the first
and second defense lines (See Fig. 1 [1]). So the reliability of
the relay protection system and the SSCS plays an important
role in the stability control of power system. However,
because of technology limitations, miss-operations, weak
management system of maintenance etc., there can be
defects, great or minor, in relay protection and security and
stability control device (SSCD), leading to hidden failures
and security risks if not found in time.
Hidden failures are caused by the device’s defects or
human factors, bound to weakening the device’s reliability.
They produce no immediate action on the device and
power system in a normal operating environment, and only
possibly are triggered in an abnormal pressure state, e.g.
grounded short-circuit fault, load-flow reversion and great
drop of voltage or a harsh operating environment.
Obviously hidden failures are covert, once triggered,
leading the improper operation of relay protection and
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SSCD, which possibly cause cascading failure of power
system with huge losses of load and power supply, even
blackouts, and further bring about a great loss of the
national economy. Although hidden failures are uncovered
by some other events in a quite low probability, they might
break through the first and second defense lines of China’s
power system once triggered, which can’t be ignored for
the profound impact on power grids and society.
Hidden failures of relay protection caused many black-
outs of power systems, i.e. the WSCC blackout in 1994 [2],
the ‘‘814’’ Blackout in America and Canada in 2003, the
large-scale power failure in Brazil in 2011 [3], and the
power failure in Indonesia in 2012. Blackout accidents
resulted from hidden failures of SSCD have also happened
many a time, such as the two WSCC blackouts in 1996 [2]
and the large-scale power failure in 2009 [4]. What’s more,
the ‘‘71’’ accident of Central China (Henan) Power Grid in
2006 is evoked by hidden failures of both relay protection
devices and security control devices.
Study of hidden failure holds great significance for
ensuring security and stability of power grid, people’s
lives, and national development, including the mechanism
of hidden failure’s impact on power systems and the hidden
failure monitoring approaches. Large amounts of studies
and discussions about protection hidden failure have been
done at home and abroad. This paper reviews these work
and summarizes issues related with protection hidden
failures: classification methods, probability model, research
methods and monitoring measures. The possible hidden-
failure risks of SSCD are presented based on the knowl-
edge of the devices’ characteristics and operating experi-
ence. It also briefly analyzes the influence of hidden
failures caused by cooperation problem among relay pro-
tections, SSCSs, and parameters of power plants in oper-
ation related to the power grid. Last but not least, it
proposes prospects on hidden-failure research, including
modeling, risk evaluation methods, research result appli-
cation, the coordination problem hiding between the relay
protection and the SSCS, and operation management of
secondary equipment, hoping to provide some reference for
the future research in this field.
2 Analysis of relay-protection hidden failures
2.1 Classification of protection hidden failures
Since the concept of relay-protection hidden failures [5]
was put forward for the first time in 1994, the influence of
relay-protection hidden failures with its research has been
paid more and more attention. The protection hidden fail-
ures are classified in different ways, which are generally
based on the causes of the hidden failures [6, 7], protection
element functionality defect (PEFD) [8], and the dynamic
and static characteristics of relay protection devices [9].
The detail of the three ways is as follows:
1) Classification based on the causes of the hidden
failures. It divides hidden failures into five ones: a.
hidden failures caused by hardware faults, such as
damages or defects of device elements; b. hidden
failures caused by system errors of protection soft-
ware, such as logic errors of protection principle and
version errors of software; c. hidden failures caused by
protection setting values, such as improper settings
and man-made setting errors; d. hidden failures caused
by natural environment, like bad climatic conditions or
storm disasters; e. hidden failures caused by improper
manual operation or ill maintenance.
2) Classification based on PEFD. It consists of hidden
failures caused by hardware faults (PEFD-A) and by
human errors and protection settings (PEFD-B).
3) Classification based on the dynamic and static charac-
teristics of relay protection devices. It divides hidden
failures of protection devices into dynamic hidden
failures and static hidden failures. The static character-
istic of protection devices is that if the protection device
doesn’t fulfill the starting conditions, it will only do
electric-parameter measurement and calculation or do
data collection and start judgment; while the logic
comparison and tripping output are not in consideration,
mainly with the hardware devices, mutual-inductor
measurement circuit, connecting cables, terminals, pre-
process circuit of relay protection, sampling and sam-
pling-value calculation. The hidden failures in these
links are called static hidden failures. Dynamic charac-
teristic of protection is that when the protection meets
with the starting conditions, the fault parameters will be
measured and logic comparison will be done, mainly
with links of measurement, calculation, and blocking-
signal inspection. The hidden failures in these links are
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Fig. 1 The stability control and the three-defense lines power system
in China
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Although the three classification methods of hidden
failures appear different, all of them think over the clas-
sification from hardware and software, and then classified
hidden failures by considering detailed factors like human
behaviors and design defects of devices.
2.2 Probability models of hidden failures of relay
protection system
The probability of relay-protection hidden failure is the
first problem to be solved during the research, which can be
solved now mainly by probability statistical method and
probability model method. The probability value obtained
by probability statistical method is a fixed value, which can
be used to evaluate the cascading failure risk caused by
hidden failures, but can’t reflect the change of hidden
failure probability value along with the real-time operating-
condition such as line power flow, bus voltage, and system
frequency. By the probability model method, the hidden
failure probability of a particular protection system or a
particular protection scheme can be worked out under
different operating conditions. So far, 4 probability models
of relay protection hidden failure have been proposed:
hidden failure probability model of zone III transmission-
line distance protection [10, 11], hidden failure probability
model of over-current protection [12], hidden failure
probability model of line protection considered over-flow
[13], and hidden failure probability model of generator
protection considered terminal-voltage [14]. The hidden
failure probability value of zone III transmission-line dis-
tance protection is decided by the impedance seen by
protection devices; the hidden failure probability of over-
current protection devices is related to the magnitude of
line current; the hidden failure probability of line protec-
tion considered over-flow is related to the magnitude of
active line-load-flow; the hidden failure probability of
generator protection considered terminal-voltage is related
to the magnitude of generator’s terminal voltage. The [15]
catalogued protection’s failure to operation and second-
type mal-operation as hidden failures in consideration of
the types of relay protection failures. Taking the proba-
bility obtained from the above hidden-failure probability
models as the probability of protection’s second-type mal-
operation, a general hidden failure probability model is
built on the basis of Markov, in which the protection sys-
tem involves protective devices with associated circuit
breakers.
Among the factors that result in hidden failures of relay
protection equipment, there is no lack of human negligence
or errors, production quality of devices, devices manage-
ment & maintenance, etc. These factors usually have
effects on the fitness of software/hardware system and
control scheme of the secondary equipment to the grid
operation mode at that time. Throughout all processes of
protection hidden failure modeling, there are two ideas.
One which is often used is to work out hidden failure
probability of relay protection devices and how it changes
with the electric parameters (voltage, current, and line
power flow) by taking the equipment’s software/hardware
and control scheme into account. The other one is to work
out hidden failure probability by considering the relay
protection as a whole. These modeling processes only
reflect the consequences of human negligence or errors,
production quality of devices, equipment management &
maintenance, etc., but don’t embody how these factors
affect protection hidden failure probability. The problem is
worth thinking over, and if solved will help reduce human
negligence or errors, perfect the devices, and improve the
coordination between devices and power grid.
2.3 Effects and research methods of hidden failures
The relay protection’s failure actions or malfunctions
caused by its hidden failures weaken the reliability of
protection system. When the power grid is abnormal, the
triggering of relay-protection hidden failures may result in
N-2 events [16], even cascading failures, which increases
the insecurity and instability, bringing load isolation,
power-supply isolation, out-of-step separation and even
overall instability.
Lots of risk assessment methods have been proposed for
quantifying the influence severity of relay-protection hid-
den failures on power system. Risk assessment methods
which are the most used in assessing reliability are devel-
oped and improved on the basis of certainty analysis
methods and probabilistic analysis methods [17]. So they
synthesize technical economics and quantitative eco-
nomics. The risk assessment methods analyze relay pro-
tection reliability in terms of risk, mainly by Markov, event
tree and fault tree. The output risk indicators of device
level separately are failure rate and availability of a device,
risks of load isolation & power-supply isolation, and the
margin of interface transmission. In addition, the risk
indicators of primary-system level that is security & sta-
bility indicators can also be obtained by event tree analysis
method. The risk indicators of primary-system level
including grid separation risk and integrated risk can be
obtained by fault tree analysis method.
The three analysis methods, i.e. Markov, event tree and
fault tree, have different characteristics of application in
the effect analysis of relay-protection hidden failures on
power grid. Compared with the probability method, Mar-
kov is more applicable to the relay protection system that is
a repairable system [18, 19]. Currently, the probabilistic
statistical method is often used to build hidden failure
probability models of relay-protection, in terms of the state
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change of power system, like load-flow transfer. But it is
not as accurate as Markov method in assessing the hidden
failure probability of protection. However, Markov method
needs lots of samples to ensure the accuracy of Markov,
which must bear a heavy computation burden. In Markov
method, the event’s current state depends only on the last
state, while event tree obeying the time sequence starts
from the primary event, reasons out possible outcomes and
identify the hazard source. For an example, based on the
analysis of the hidden failure triggering conditions of relay-
protection by event tree, it starts from a certain initial event
and reason out the malfunction probability model of
associated relay-protection under different contingences
[20]. However, the event tree requires confirming object
firstly, which demands thorough knowledge of the system
structure, occurrence & probability of relevant accidents
and the severity of consequences caused by accidents.
Similar to the analysis by event tree, the analysis by fault
tree is intuitively, straightforward, clear and logical. E.g.,
the dynamic process of the cascading resulted from relay-
protection hidden failures is analyzed by fault tree so as to
find out the line or generator protection ‘‘pre-malfunction
set’’ [21] (the ‘‘pre-malfunction set’’ means the set of line
or generator protection associated with the removed
lines).
Aside by the above methods, certainty method, proba-
bility method and risk method, protection reliability is
analyzed by other methods such as GO method [22] and the
importance analysis on relay-protection hidden failures
based on risk assessment [23]. The importance analysis on
relay-protection hidden failures is derived from the element
importance analysis which is an important approach for
system reliability analysis. Its purpose is to identify the key
elements that have crucial effect on system’s reliability so
as to objectively increase the overall reliability of the
system at low cost [24].
The influence of protection hidden failures on system
can also be analyzed by simulation. Monte Carlo [25] and
Importance Sampling [26] are important tools for simula-
tion analysis. Monte Carlo, the simulation method in
probability method, take advantage of the comprehensive
statistical data of power system state, to calculate the
reliability indicators of a certain period of time, and can’t
be fit to analyzing the frequency and probability of events
that do not often occur. Based on whether the simulation
periods are a sequence, the Monte Carlo method can be
divided into Monte Carlo method with time sequence and
Monte Carlo method without time sequence. The impor-
tance sampling method does not use the primary proba-
bility of hidden failure model; instead, in order to increase
the probability of cascading, it does simulation with a
probability value greater than the primary probability under
the premise that the mean of probability value remains
constant. Submission of a manuscript implies: that the
work described has not been published before; that it is not
under consideration for publication anywhere else; that its
publication has been approved by all co-authors, if any, as
well as by the responsible authorities—tacitly or explic-
itly—at the institute where the work has been carried out.
2.4 Monitoring method of hidden failures
In recent years, many researches on protection-system
hidden failure have been done, i.e. researches on protection
system reliability modeling and influence of protection
devices on Power System’s reliability. Research on the
monitoring and control of protection hidden failure is also
involved [7], which is aimed at taking precautionary
measures against hidden failures to avoid serious cascading
of power system. A technology embodiment for the mon-
itoring and control system against relay-protection hidden
failures [27] was proposed by AG Phadke and JS Thorp of
Virginia Tech in 1995, but it was not applied in industry
since the technology was not mature enough. In 2004, a
monitoring system was developed against hidden failures
by the wide-area protection system, however was of poor
reliability and the cost was high [28]. The detection of
hidden failures depends on the running state of Power
System [29]. The off-line detection which is widely used
now can’t meet with the requirements, high security, high
reliability and real time, and is unable to do an exhaustive
detection for hidden failures. Therefore, new methods
should be worked out for on-line detection.
That off-line setting value is improper is main contrib-
utor to hidden defects of protection settings. The off-line
setting values are mostly set and modified manually, thus
easily result in security risks. Particularly, off-line settings
if have not been modified for a long time, will deteriorated
the performance of devices, and may be not adapt to the
real-time operation mode of power grid. One of the solu-
tions to get over off-line setting defects is on-line setting
[30] for protection devices. An online intelligent early
warning system of protective relaying [31] was developed
and applied to the power grid of some domestic province.
Based on the warning system Scholars at home checked
setting hidden defects of protection online, and assessed the
risk brought by these defects for the weak links of pro-
tection hidden failures. The early warning system sent
signals about these weak links and associated measures
could be taken timely for the security of power grid.
The hidden failures of protection system are proved to be
the key contributors to the wide-area disturbance [32].
Identifying the key lines affected by hidden failures [33]
and taking associated measures can inhibit cascading
development and reduce blackouts. Thus, some researches
built pre-malfunction sets of lines where protection hidden
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failures might be triggered. But these pre-malfunction sets
are only sets of lines connected with the primary fault line
and the researches didn’t analyze the cause of line protec-
tion malfunctions systematically from the point of the
essence of hidden failures, which lead to the obtained pre-
malfunction sets incomplete. This problem has got solved in
[34] that firstly put the protection hidden failures as a part of
contingencies constituted by different accidents, secondly
exposed the hidden risks of cascading during selecting N–k
contingencies, and last found out vulnerable lines and the
key protection. The hidden failure monitoring of other
equipment like control circuit in high voltage circuit
breaker in protection system is to check hidden failures by
reverse point-by-point investigation method [35].
3 Analysis of hidden failures of SSCD
SSCDs widely used in China are the second defensive
line [36] which is aimed at ensuring security, stability and
reliability of power system. The SSCDs of multiple power
plants or substations communicate with each other, con-
stituting a SSCS with a hierarchical classification of control
scheme like Electric Power Alarming and Coordinated
Control System (EACCS). The EACCS in Jiangsu Pro-
vince of China has a typical control structure of 4-hierar-
chy, dispatch center station-control station—control
substation—implementation station from top to bottom.
Since the SSCS takes charge of a regional power grid, once
it goes wrong, enormous losses will take place, which has
been proved by the ‘‘730’’ Load-Shedding Fault in
Zengcheng in Guangdong province of China in 2004 and
the ‘‘71’’ Accident of Central China Power Grid in 2009.
The losses are so huge that it cannot wait to conduct
researches on the hidden failures in SSCDs and associated
effects on the power grid.
According to the accident experiences in power grids
and the structure of the SSCS, the hidden failures of the
SSCD are described in five links: measuring, strategy,
setting, communication, and voting pattern.
1) Measuring
CT and PT are used for the measuring of electric
parameters by the SSCD. The break-line accidents of
PT are easy to take place and remain hidden until
triggered by other events; the remaining current of CT
second winding can influence the judgment of SSCD
[37]. In addition, that the chip of measuring circuit
goes wrong will influence the accurate of measured
values which reflect electric information, easily result-
ing in incorrect judgment and malfunction of the
SSCD.
2) Strategy
A SSCD is the implementation medium of various
control measures. The ways of carrying out its control
strategies usually include off-line decision and on-line
pre-decision. If control strategies cannot fit the real-
time operation mode of power grid, malfunction of the
SSCS including over-shedding, under-shedding and
mal-shedding will take place, further expanding the
accidents in power grid [38].
3) Setting
The correctness of setting in device determines the
efficiency of device and whether the monitored object
can make right judgment about the type of faults as
fast as faults occur. Unreasonable or incorrect settings
impair the security of the SSCD and the stability of
power system [39]. For instance, in the ‘‘71’’ Accident
of Central China Power Grid, the mismatching
between a setting and the real-time operation mode
of power grid led to action failure of the security &
stability control devices in Songshan substation and
finally expended the accident.
4) Communication
Generally, how to configure a SSCD in the power grid
should take control range and functions to be achieved
of the device and power system planning into consid-
eration. In order to achieve large-scale stability
control, SSCDs of multiple plants are usually config-
ured as a SSCS via communication channel and
communication interface equipment, and work coop-
eratively, to achieve the regional security and stability
control. However, in the communication progress
between SSCDs, the reception and execution of
commands in the SSCS are affected by error codes,
unstable transmission in communication channel, not-
in-time information transfer. It brings about that the
strategy cannot be executed at right time or security &
control devices cannot act properly, resulting in more
serious accidents. On July 30, 2004, the security and
stability control subsystem of Zengcheng, Guangdong
mal-operated with 714 MW load shedding for the
reason that communication codes were error and there
were loopholes in the communication module and the
verification links.
5) Voting pattern
Redundancy design is introduced into enhance the
security and reliability of the SSCS. The voting pattern
determines the characteristics of the malfunction
prevention of a SSCS, so in the process of redundancy
design it needs to consider the type of voting pattern of
control outlet logic in a SSCS. There are mainly three
types of voting patterns, e.g. ‘‘2 out of 3’’ pattern, ‘‘2
out of 2’’ pattern, and ‘‘1 out of 2’’ pattern.
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In the ‘‘2 out of 3’’ pattern, only when at least two of
three sets of SSCDs act can the outlet action be permitted.
This will prevent malfunctions of the SSCS that are caused
by hidden failures in any one of the three sets of SSCDs.
But this pattern is the least adopted because of high cost,
wiring complexity, operation and maintenance difficulty,
etc.
In the ‘‘2 out of 2’’ pattern, the outlets of the two sets of
SCCDs are connected serially, so the outlet tripping can be
achieved only when both of the two sets of devices act.
This will effectively prevent malfunctions of the system
caused by hidden failures in either one of the two sets and
ensure the reliability of the system. However, if neither of
the 2 sets acts for their hidden failures, tripping pulse will
not be transferred to the ultimate executive and then action
failures of the SSCS will come into being.
The ‘‘1 out of 2’’ pattern is the most adopted at present.
In this pattern, if either set of SSCDs acts, the outlet will be
permitted [40]. This can prevent action failures that are
caused by failures of either set of SSCDs, but it cannot
prevent the mal-operation of the SSCS for hidden failures
in the SSCDs. Various measures of preventing mal-oper-
ation have to be taken to ensure the reliability of a SSCS.
4 Analysis of coordination hidden failures of relay
protection system and SSCS
Among reasons of blackouts, there are also coordination
hidden failures, which may lie between relay protections,
between SSCSs, between the relay protection system and
the SSCS, or among power plants’ parameters related to the
grid, relay protection system and SSCS, affecting the
security of power grids, sometimes even deadly.
4.1 Coordination hidden failures between relay
protections
What a relay protection cares about is the element in
power grid and relay protections make decisions all alone
[41], which make the coordination between relay protec-
tions poor.
The poor coordination between relay protections mainly
results from the unreasonable setting matching between
one protection and its lower protection [20], i.e., that zone
II or zone III setting of distance protection doesn’t satisfy
the selectivity results in the disharmony cooperation
between a main protection and its associated backup pro-
tection or its lower protection. The hidden defects of
cooperation between relay protections may be caused by
other factors like design schemes. i.e., there exists a
coordination hidden defect in the design scheme that the
bus couple auto-switch protection (BCASP) and bus
differential protection (BDP) block each other. The hidden
defect remains undetected by the occurrence of a single
simple fault, but when complicated failures occur and
cannot be identified by the judgment circuit of the relay
protection for the coordination hidden defect between
BCASP and BDP [42], serious failures may follow.
4.2 Coordination hidden failures between SSCSs
The conventional SSCS takes charge of the stability of a
regional power grid, usually restricting the control range in
a provincial grid. Distributed in a regional power grid, the
early SSCS made decisions independently and took
appropriate measures against failures listed in the control
strategy. With the development of EHV AC/DC transmis-
sion network, strong electrical connection will be estab-
lished between regional power grids. It may occur that the
operation of some SSCS in region A becomes a disturbance
to the SCCS in region B, though the operation is correct for
the stability problems caused by faults in region A [35]. For
example, the rapid and large-scale transfer of load flow
caused by generator tripping or separation in region A can
lead to action failures, malfunctions or unexpected actions
of the SSCS in region B. Therefore, in order to prevent
such hidden failures, the coordination between SSCSs in
different regions must be considered and attached impor-
tance to.
4.3 Coordination hidden failures among relay
protection, SSCS and parameters of power
plants related to power grid
It also should be paid attention to that whether it’s
coordinate among relay protections, the SSCS and
parameters of power plants related to power grid. The
incoordination among the three was also looked on as one
of contribute factors to some blackouts by some experts.
The consequences resulted from the coordination problem
had been proved by the WSCC 2 blackouts of United States
in 1996 [2], the ‘‘814’’ Blackout in America and Canada in
2003 [43], and the Italian blackout in 2003 [44]. The series
of accidents alarm that close attention should be paid to the
coordination hidden failures between the relay protections
and the SSCS, or among parameters of power plants related
to power grid, the relay protection and the SSCS. With the
large scale new energy connected to power grid in China,
the grid-connected control and protection of wind energy
generation and photovoltaic power generation brings a new
challenge to the relay protection system and the SSCS. The
operating experience about new energy indicates that the
tripping accident of large-scale wind turbine generators in
Northwest China Power Grid in 2011 was caused by hidden
coordination problem among the feeder protection, SVC/
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SVG and the grid-connected protection of wind turbines.
Moreover, that large-scale new energy is connected to the
power grid in centralization brings new challenges to the
adaptability of various criterions of the SSCS. Among
these challenges the criterion for fault trip and control
measures may become invalid. Therefore, there is necessity
to study hidden failures caused by generator-power grid
coordination problem; otherwise a tiny accident could lead
to instability and large scale blackouts of power grid.
5 Conclusions
By summarizing and analyzing the research on hidden
failures of the relay protection and the SSCS, the author
thinks that the further research on hidden failures of the
relay protection and the SSCS in the future should be
conducted as follows:
1) Hidden failure modeling. So far, most are hidden
failure probability model of over-current protection
and distance protection, current differential protection
which is often used as main protection seldom
included. Research on hidden failure in SSCS is just
in its infancy. It will be a key to build a proper
probability model of hidden failure in the SSCS. The
control scheme of the SSCS is a distributed control
scheme and more complicated than that of the relay
protection. During the model building of hidden
failure in the SSCS, it has to consider the effect of
action failures or malfunctions of devices caused by
hidden failures not only on protected elements and the
neighboring elements, but also on the area charged by
the SSCS. So inevitably it is more complicated to
build hidden failure model of the SSCS. The proba-
bility and severity of consequences caused by different
hidden failures might be different and should be taken
into account to assess the effects of hidden failures.
The outcome of the assessment should be taken as one
of considerations in building probability model of
hidden failures in secondary equipment. Work in the
field is underway and the details will be introduced in
follow-up articles.
2) Risk assessment of hidden failure. As members of
secondary equipment, relay protections and SSCDs are
a part of operational risk sources of power grid. Until
now, the severity assessment of the effect of hidden
failures in the relay protection on power grid is
generally carried out based on the point of risk.
According to the ideas of risk assessment proposed in
the research with achievements, such as research on
power grid faults caused by lighting [45], hidden
failures of secondary equipment will be treated as a
new input to assess risk online and analyze the security
of power grid, which will be a new trend to study
hidden failures. The modeling and analysis of hidden
failures in the relay protection and SSCS need the
support of large amounts of operating data, but the
categorization of operating data is not complete, and
the expert knowledge is of ambiguity and uncertainty.
To acquire adequate data it needs to reinforce the
unified management of the monitoring and accident
record of secondary system. However that’s not
enough. New methods should also be explored simul-
taneously to evaluate the risk of hidden failure under
the condition of data deficiency.
3) Coordination hidden failure of the relay protection and
the SSCS. Although the coordination problem between
relay protections has been concentrated on, research
on the coordination problem is still relatively deficient
and requires further studies. Furthermore, after the
separation of power grid and power plants, the
coordination problem among the relay protection, the
SSCS and parameters of power plants related to power
grid has been gradually becoming outstanding, which
has to be paid attention to since it is a big threat hiding
in the operation of power grid.
4) Application of hidden failure research. The achieve-
ments of hidden failure research should be helpful to
enrich the collection of contingencies and pre-decision
system, and strengthen the prevention and emergency
control system. Simultaneously, it should also be
helpful to identify the coordination hidden failures
between different controls on security and stability of
power system, and find out the weak links of power
system. Then associated measures can be taken timely
to enhance the security and reliability of power system.
5) Operation management of secondary equipment.
Human factors are also contributors to hidden failures
of the relay protection and the SSCS. The limitation of
testing-personnel quality and testing technology could
bring about hidden failures for ignorance of some
defects in devices. So it should be done to obey
relevant electric regulations strictly, to update these
regulations with the development of power grid, and to
reinforce the management of the links like debugging,
operation & maintenance, and setting. Then some
hidden dangers can be avoided and series accidents
evoked by tiny problems can be reduced as much as
possible. Though action criterions for relay protections
and SSCDs have been established based on the
operating characteristics of the power grid, these
criterions can’t be adapt to the operating characteristics
of power grids forever and need to be updated timely. A
device itself has to be faced with many operation
problems such as harsh operating environment and
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aging of components resulted from device’s long time
operation, possibly becoming contribute factors to
hidden failures too. So in order to reduce accidents
caused by devices’ hidden failures as much as possible
strict supervision and early warning should be done
with the condition-based maintenance date of sec-
ondary equipment.
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